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 The best memories 
 IDENTITY, NARRATIVE, AND OBJECTS 
 RICHARD HEERSMINK AND 
CHRISTOPHER JUDE MCCARROLL 
 Introduction 
 M E M O RY  I S  E V E RY W H E R E  I N   B L A D E  Runner 2049 . 1  From the dead tree that serves as a memorial and a site of 
remembrance (“Who keeps a dead tree?”), to the “fl ashbulb” memories 
individuals hold about the moment of the “blackout,” when all the elec-
tronic stores of data were irretrievably erased (“everyone remembers 
where they were at the blackout”). 2 Indeed, the data wiped out in the 
blackout itself involves a loss of memory (“all our memory bearings 
from the time, they were all damaged in the blackout”). Memory, and 
lack of it, permeates place, where from the post- blackout Las Vegas 
Deckard remembers it as somewhere you could “forget your troubles.” 
Memory is a commodity, called upon and consumed by the Wallace 
Corporation, purchased from the memory- maker, Dr Ana Stelline, who 
constructs and implants “the best memories” in replicants so as to 
instil in them real human responses. Memory is ubiquitous in  BR2049 , 
involving humans, replicants, objects, and machines. Even “God,” we 
are told, “remembered Rachael.” 
 Nowhere, though, is the depiction of memory more important than 
in the attempt to solve a question of identity. Offi cer K has a memory 
of his past. Even though he knows it is an implant, it is a memory he 
is emotionally attached to, frequently narrating it to Joi, his digital 
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girlfriend. But it is a memory that starts to puzzle and trouble him. 
When K discovers the remains of a dead replicant, a female NEXUS 
7, he uncovers a secret— this replicant was pregnant and died during 
childbirth, a discovery that could “break the world.” K is charged with 
hunting down the offspring and making the problem disappear. Yet as 
K starts seeking answers to the question of the offspring’s identity he 
becomes inextricably caught up in the mystery. Is he merely K, or is he 
Joe, the miracle son of Rachael and Deckard? The answer to this question 
hinges on K’s memory. But is the memory genuine? Is the memory  his ? 
 BR2049 encourages us to think deeply about the nature of memory, 
identity, and the relation between them. Indeed, the fi lm does not just 
serve as a starting point for thinking  about philosophical issues related to 
memory and identity. Rather, as we show in this chapter, the fi lm seems 
to offer a view  on these philosophical issues.  BR2049 offers us a view of 
memory as spread out over people, objects, and the environment, and 
it shows us that memory’s role in questions of identity goes beyond 
merely accurately recalling one’s past. Identity depends not on memory 
 per se , but partly on what we use memory for. 
 Humanhood and personhood 
 BR2049 is, essentially, the story of a replicant on a quest to discover 
his identity— a journey that takes him from being a mere replicant to 
coming to terms with believing he is a “real boy,” but then only to dis-
cover he was not a child born into the world after all. The concepts of 
humanhood and personhood play a key role in the narrative arc of the 
fi lm. Let’s have a closer look at what philosophers have to say about these 
concepts. 
 In the metaphysics of personal identity, two questions are 
distinguished. One, what is personhood? Two, is there continuity of 
personhood over time?  BR2049 explores both questions. We’ll focus 
on the second question, but to answer it we fi rst need to address the 
notion of personhood. Philosophers have suggested various properties 
characterising personhood, such as agency, sentience, consciousness, 
self- awareness, and the possession of certain cognitive and emotional 
states (see Kind,  2015 , for a nice overview). All these capacities come in 
degrees and have to be satisfi ed suffi ciently in order for personhood to 
exist in an individual. Most adult human beings suffi ciently satisfy these 
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properties, but a foetus or patient in an irreversible vegetative state does 
not. However, given the complexity of these capacities and the fact that 
they come in degrees, personhood is not an all- or- nothing phenom-
enon. Infants, toddlers, feral children, animals such as chimpanzees, and 
perhaps even artifi cial intelligence systems exhibit some of these cap-
acities to some degree. We are born as humans but gradually become 
persons when our cognitive, emotional, and moral capacities develop. 
It is diffi cult, if not impossible, to pinpoint an exact moment in time 
when humans become persons. But it is clear that most adult humans 
are persons. 
 It is important to realise that personhood and humanhood are two 
different concepts. Persons are sentient, conscious, and self- aware. For 
these reasons, they are part of a moral community, having certain rights 
and obligations. Humans, on the other hand, are mere biological entities 
that possess a metabolism, a specifi c body plan, human genetic material, 
and a specifi c evolutionary lineage. So, a foetus or a patient in an irrevers-
ible vegetative state may qualify as human but not qualify as a person. 
For these reasons, even though mere biological humans may still have 
rights they will lack obligations. In short, personhood is a higher- level 
moral category, whereas humanhood is a lower- level biological category. 
 BR2049 seems to operate with a different conceptual framework 
because being human is more important than being a person. Humans 
have souls and empathy, whereas replicants lack these features. The 
distinguishing property of humanhood suggested by the fi rst  Blade 
Runner fi lm is empathy. The Voight- Kampff test is used to gauge physio-
logical responses associated with empathy, and supposedly only humans 
exhibit this response.  BR2049 suggests, at least on a fi rst reading, that the 
distinguishing property of humanhood is having a soul. 
 Do replicants have personhood? The fi lm suggests that they do, 
because they exhibit the properties that characterise personhood such as 
agency, sentience, consciousness, self- awareness, and so on. But they are 
not humans in the biological sense of the term as they were not born 
and do not have a human evolutionary lineage. Rather, they are genetic-
ally engineered, manufactured in a laboratory, and come into the world 
as adults. So, the way replicants come into existence is different from 
biological humans. This is important because, as K says, “To be born is to 
have a soul, I guess.” Since replicants aren’t born, they have no soul. This 
is why the child of Deckard and Rachael (Dr Ana Stelline) is so important 
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for the narrative arc of the fi lm because it means that replicants have 
the potential to become human. It’s unclear, however, what a soul pre-
cisely is and whether K refers to a notion of a non- material soul or a 
metaphorical notion meaning something like the essence of a person or 
someone’s consciousness. When Lt. Joshi asks K to kill the offspring of 
Rachael and Deckard, the following dialogue unfolds:
 K:  I’ve never retired something that was born before. 
 LT. JOSHI:  What’s the difference? 
 K:  To be born is to have a soul, I guess. 
 LT. JOSHI:  Hey. You’ve been getting on fi ne without one. 
 K:  What’s that, madam? 
 LT. JOSHI:  A soul. 
 K seems to be struggling to articulate something that separates humans 
from mere replicants, something that makes humans special. On one 
reading, the thought that K is struggling to articulate is the idea that 
having a soul relates to holding an empathic capacity, and that this 
empathic capacity, part of which may involve feeling love and being 
loved, is the essence of humanity. Replicants do not show empathy, 
apparently, but K’s reluctance to kill the child seems to subtly betray 
the idea that this is not so. This reading brings  BR2049 close to the idea 
presented in the original fi lm about the importance of empathy to being 
human, and it also closely intertwines the notions of humanhood and 
personhood. This is because we can distinguish two senses of what 
it means to be “human.” In the fi rst instance we can simply mean 
humanity in the biological sense. But we can also understand humanity 
in an evaluative sense, where such “evaluative humanity” means “to 
be disposed to kindness, forgiveness and in general to be empathetic” 
(Gaut,  2015 : 35). The original fi lm makes it clear that such evaluative 
humanity is open to replicants, and by the end of the fi lm,  BR2049 makes 
it clear that K demonstrates evaluative humanity. Going beyond the Tyrell 
Corporation’s sales pitch, we can say that in many cases the replicants 
can be described as “more human than human.” By the end of the fi lm, 
K has found his empathy, his emotional connection to others; K has, in 
a sense, found his soul. 
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 Memory, narrative, and identity 
 BR2049 provides a fascinating cinematic thought experiment regarding 
the continuity of personal identity over time. Philosophers have 
suggested that either biological or psychological properties ensure 
continuity of such identity. Some philosophers argue that our identity 
over time consists in having the same body. Others argue that identity 
consists in the continuity of our mental states, including beliefs, desires, 
intentions, and memories. These two camps are broadly characterised 
as biological and psychological approaches to personal identity.  BR2049 
operates with a psychological approach, as it portrays memory as crucial 
for identity. 
 Replicants have not had childhoods, yet they still have implanted 
memories of childhood experiences, many of which are made by a 
memory- maker (Dr Ana Stelline). K, for example, has a memory of a 
childhood experience. His memory image depicts a young child in an 
orphanage being chased by a group of boys who want a carved wooden 
horse the child possesses. The image then portrays the child staring into 
a furnace, no longer in possession of the horse, having secretly hidden 
it. And even though the child suffers violence at the hands of the boys, 
he (or she) does not reveal its whereabouts. 
 While the content of this memory does not change during the fi lm, 
K’s relation to it, namely, what he thinks it depicts, does shift over time. 
K begins by thinking his memory is an implant. He knows that he is a 
replicant and that he never had a childhood, but nonetheless he is emo-
tionally attached to this memory, and he frequently narrates it to Joi. 
Then, he begins to think that his childhood memory is genuine ― that 
he experienced the event in question, that he is the child depicted in 
the memory image ― and the memory takes on even more import-
ance. Finally, upon fi nding out the truth about the memory ― that the 
memory- maker has used one of her own genuine memories for this 
implant, and that the child in the memory is her, Ana Stelline ― K uses 
this memory, and the emotional import of it, to guide his actions and 
to infl uence not only his own future but also that of Ana’s. As we shall 
see, it is this shift in K’s appraisal of the memory that appears to be 
responsible for his subsequent transformation; it is not the content of 
the memory that matters, it is K’s attitude towards it. 
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 It is on this memory that the question of K’s identity hangs, and 
we will return to it throughout the rest of this chapter. We fi rst note 
that there is an important ambiguity in the notion of “identity” here. 
It could be argued that throughout the fi lm K never doubts that he is 
the  same person across time , whoever he is. What he is unsure of is  who he 
really is: his “identity” in the sense of the characteristics and narrative 
that are true of him. Yet, even though K may not doubt whether he is 
the same person across time in a metaphysical sense (a question about 
reidentifi cation), from the point of view of personal identity in terms 
of characterisation (Schechtman,  1996 ), K’s identity does change over 
time. Indeed, it is the memory of the childhood experience, or more 
precisely K’s relation to this memory, which effects this change in 
identity. The characterisation question of identity relates to  practical iden-
tity and concerns the characterising properties of an individual such 
as one’s beliefs, desires, preferences, inclinations, and dispositions. It 
is thus about describing what makes a person the person he or she is. 
The reidentifi cation question, by contrast, concerns  numerical identity , 
and is about the conditions under which a person at one point in 
time is properly reidentifi ed at another point in time. For Schechtman, 
bodily continuity theories speak more to the reidentifi cation question, 
whereas psychological continuity theories better explain identity in 
the sense of characterisation, and how questions of characterisation 
relate to our practical interests in identity (Schechtman,  1996 ). 
 At this point, at least three questions arise. One, why do replicants 
have memories of a childhood at all? Two, what roles do memories and 
narratives play in identity? Three, can there be psychological continuity 
between different persons? 
 Regarding the fi rst question, in the fi rst  Blade Runner movie Tyrell tells 
Deckard, “If we gift them [replicants] the past, we create a cushion 
or pillow for their emotions, and consequently we can control them 
better.” Ultimately, memories are used as a mechanism of control. The 
following dialogue between Offi cer K and Ana Stelline not only sheds 
light on the relation between memory, emotion, and identity, but also 
suggests that authentic memories, or at least the feeling of authenticity, 
are needed to generate real human responses.
 K:   Why are you so good? What makes your 
memories so authentic? 
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 ANA STELLINE:  Well, there’s a bit of every artist in their work. 
But I was locked in a sterile chamber at eight … 
So, if I wanted to see the world, I had to imagine 
it. Got very good at imagining. Wallace needs my 
talent to maintain a stable product. I think it’s 
only kind. Replicants live such hard lives, made 
to do what we’d rather not. I can’t help your 
future, but I can give you good memories to 
think back on and smile. 
 K:   It’s nice. 
 ANA STELLINE:  It’s better than nice. It feels authentic. And if you 
have authentic memories, you have real human 
responses. Wouldn’t you agree? 
 K:   Are they all constructed, or do you ever use ones 
that are real? 
 ANA STELLINE:  It’s illegal to use real memories, offi cer. 
 K:   How can you tell the difference? Can you tell if 
something … really happened? 
 ANA STELLINE:  They all think it’s about more detail. But that’s 
not how memory works. We recall with our 
feelings. Anything real should be a mess. 
 Having childhood memories thus “maintains a stable product,” in that 
replicants have more coherent identities, making them better slaves. 
Moreover, memories that feel authentic generate real human responses 
and, conversely, feelings trigger certain memories. This dialogue thus 
sketches a view on the relation between memory, emotion, and identity 
as mutually interwoven. Coherent identities require emotionally laden 
personal memories (Goldie,  2012 ; Heersmink,  2018 ). Even though 
K  knows his memory is merely an implant, he still somehow feels it is 
authentic, and it comforts him to think of it. Just like the fi ctional poet, 
John Shade, in his favourite novel,  Pale Fire , by Vladimir Nabokov, K’s
 vision [memory] reeked with truth. It had the tone, 
 The quiddity and quaintness of its own 
 Reality … 
 Often when troubled by the outer glare 
 Of street and strife, inward [he’d] turn, and there, 
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 There in the background of [his] soul it stood, 
 Old Faithful! And its presence always would 
 Console [him] wonderfully. 3 
 In response to the second question, John Locke (1689/ 1975 ), or at 
least an infl uential reading of Locke, famously argues that memory is 
the criterion for continuity of personhood over time. 4 In Locke’s view, 
when I  can remember the experiences of my past self there is con-
tinuity between my past self and my present self. For Locke, specifi c 
and direct memories of the past provide continuity of selfhood over 
time. Others have taken Locke’s key insight and argued that it is not 
specifi c memories but an integrated narrative that provides continuity 
of self over time. Narrative theories of personal identity, for example 
those of Marya Schechtman ( 1996 ,  2011 ), claim that personal mem-
ories and other psychological properties are integrated into a narrative 
structure, implying that our autobiography plays a central role in who 
we are. In this view, we don’t just have a number of distinct personal 
memories, but we also integrate them into a coherent story about our 
past. Generating meaningful relations between personal memories is 
referred to as  emplotment (Ricoeur,  2004 ). Typically, this occurs through 
the agency of the person who is creating the narrative. A self- narrative 
is a subjective and personal story of a series of connected events and 
experiences that are (essential to) the person. Importantly, a self- 
narrative is seen by the person as part of an unfolding trajectory where 
the present situation follows from past events and is used to anticipate 
the future. 
 Yet here it is useful to distinguish between two levels of self-
hood: fi rst, a minimal, or embodied self and, second, a narrative self. 
As we just saw, memories and narratives typically are taken to play con-
stitutive roles in identity (Rowlands,  2017 ; Schechtman,  1996 ; but 
compare Strawson,  2004 ). Oliver Sacks ( 1985 ) describes a patient, Mr. 
Thompson, with Korsakoff syndrome. Due to his excessive drinking, 
Thompson remembers nothing for more than a few seconds, is con-
tinually disorientated, and, most importantly, cannot remember most of 
his past. He is unable to tell the narrative of his past and, as a result, he 
confabulates a different micro- narrative on the spot each time someone 
talks to him. Sacks writes that it is deeply tragic to talk to Thompson, 
who himself seems unaware of any problem. But there is, of course, a 
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problem, which is a lack of a narrative self. Sacks describes the problem 
as follows:
 It might be said that each of us constructs and lives, a “narrative,” 
and that this narrative  is us, our identities. … Each of us  is a sin-
gular narrative, which is constructed, continually, unconsciously, 
by, through, and in us— through our perceptions, our feelings, 
our thoughts, our actions, and not least, our discourse, our spoken 
narrations. A  man needs such a narrative, a continuous inner 
narrative, to maintain his identity, his self. … Deprived of con-
tinuity, of a quiet, continuous inner narrative, he [Mr. Thompson] is 
driven to a sort of narrational frenzy. 
 (Sacks,  1985 : 105– 106) 
 Thompson is, of course, still a person, as he satisfi es the criteria outlined 
above, but due to the lack of a narrative and the inability to consoli-
date new personal memories, he has no psychological continuity over 
time. So, he has a minimal self, in that he has the capacity for sub-
jective experience (Gallagher,  2000 ), but not a narrative self. Due to the 
lack of a narrative self, there is no continuity and persistence of his self 
over time, which means that his identity in the sense of characterisation 
is constantly shifting. This demonstrates how important memory and 
narrative are for identity over time. Importantly, the mere confabulations 
of Thompson do not contribute to his identity in a narrative sense. 
Rather, it is memories of events that really took place, and which hence 
exhibit consistency, that are important for one’s identity. Thompson is 
thus a human with a minimal self. We can reidentify Mr. Thompson at 
different points in time, but we cannot say that he has a coherent dia-
chronic identity. 
 Just like the original fi lm,  BR2049 plays with the notion of apparent 
memories and identity, but in a kind of mirror image. Rachael, in  Blade 
Runner , thinks her memories are genuine only to discover that they have 
been implanted. Offi cer K, however, initially knows that his memory 
is false, but begins to slowly suspect that it may in fact be real. But is 
K’s memory genuine? A straightforward answer is no. It turns out that 
K’s memory  belongs to Dr Ana Stelline, a memory- maker who designs 
memories to be implanted into replicants. Indeed, the memory  belongs 
to her in two senses:  it was she who created the memory implanted 
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in K, but it is also a memory from her own personal past. The answer 
to the question of the truth of K’s memory is therefore complicated. 
Certainly, “someone lived this” experience, but it wasn’t K, it was Ana, 
and it is the memory of Ana’s experience that K possesses. The memory 
is a genuine memory of an event in someone’s past, but it wasn’t K’s 
past. K’s memory is, on the one hand, false ― it is not his memory. On 
the other hand, however, the memory is true ― it is a genuine memory 
from the past of another person. 
 This point relates to our third question. Can there be psycho-
logical continuity between different persons? An intuitive response 
to this question is “no”— one’s memories and other psychological 
properties are one’s own and, because they can’t be shared or spread 
over individuals, there cannot be psychological continuity between 
different persons. Yet, an important objection to psychological con-
tinuity theories of personal identity can be raised at this point. 5 This 
objection bears on the answer to our third question and complicates 
matters of psychological continuity between persons. It can be charged 
that accounts of personal identity that invoke a criterion of memory 
are circular. That is, because memory provides access to our  own past 
experiences, it presupposes identity, and so any appeal to personal 
memory to explain personal identity is bound to be circular. Most 
psychological continuity theories of identity go beyond memory, 
appealing to the sharing of other psychological properties, but even 
these neo- Lockean theories fall prey to the circularity objection (Parfi t, 
 1984 : 220). 
 To blunt the force of the circularity objection, some theorists appeal 
to the notion of  quasi - memory (q- memory). 6 Q- memories are memory 
representations of past experiences that  someone had, and that are causally 
dependent (in the right kind of way) on that past experience. Personal 
memory, then, is a subclass of q- memory; personal memory is quasi- 
memory of our  own experiences (Parfi t,  1984 : 220). Because q- memory 
does not presuppose personal identity, an account of identity in terms of 
q- memory is not circular. Parfi t is clear that we currently do not quasi- 
remember other people’s experiences. But, he suggests, one day we may 
do so. Even if memory traces involve a distributed network of brain 
cells rather than being localised, we may one day develop techniques to 
implant memories into the minds of others. This possibility in our world 
is an actuality in the world of  BR2049 . 
9781138625303_pi-247.indd   96 05-Aug-19   16:36:51
THE BEST MEMORIES 97
97
 As an example of q- memory, Parfi t asks us to imagine the case 
of Jane and Paul. Jane undergoes surgery and has copies of some of 
Paul’s memory traces implanted in her brain. When she recovers con-
sciousness, Jane has vivid memories, recalled from the inside, of some 
experiences Paul had in Venice. According to Parfi t, Jane should not dis-
miss her apparent memories as mere delusions. Rather, because they 
have been caused in the right way as genuine experiences undergone 
by Paul, she should conclude that she has accurate quasi- memories of 
Paul’s experiences: “When Jane seems to remember walking about the 
Piazza, hearing the gulls, and seeing the white church, she knows part 
of what it was like to be Paul, on that day in Venice” (Parfi t,  1984 : 221). 
Importantly, this is  not to suggest, Parfi t adds, that “if I have an accurate 
quasi- memory of some past experience, this makes me the person 
who had this experience” (Parfi t,  1984 : 222). The mental life of one 
person may include a few quasi- memories of the experiences of another 
person, but for sameness of personal identity one would need to have 
many quasi- memories in common with the other person (as well as 
other properties). Nonetheless, q- memories provide knowledge about 
other people’s past lives. We know, in part, what it was like to be another 
person. 
 Think again of K’s memory. K knows that his ‘childhood’ memories 
are implanted. When Lt. Joshi asks him to tell her a childhood story, 
K says:  “I feel a little strange sharing a childhood story, considering 
I was never a child.” Yet he then discovers that the memory is genuine, 
that someone had this experience. K’s memory is a  quasi - memory. It is 
a representation of a past experience that Ana had. Of course, because 
of the ambiguity in Ana’s response (“Someone lived this”), K takes 
this memory to be one of his own. But the possibility of mistaking the 
quasi- memory for one’s own past experience is built into the notion 
of quasi- memory because of its structural ambiguity (“ someone did have 
this experience”) (Parfi t,  1984 :  220). The “someone” who lived this 
experience was not K but Ana. Even if this q- memory is not identity- 
constituting in the sense of maintaining psychological continuity with 
a previous past self, it does provide a sense in which a limited psycho-
logical continuity between two different individuals can come about. 
Although there may not be real continuity between Ana and K in that 
they are not the same person, the quasi- memories give K knowledge of 
what it was like to be Ana, at least in that moment, and these implanted 
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memories also play an important role in K’s identity (in the sense of 
characterisation). 
 Yet it is not only through quasi- memories that we can get a sense of 
what it was like to be another person. Memories and narratives are not 
just contained in the minds of individuals, they are spread over objects 
in the world and shared with others in everyday life. Such socially shared 
and physically distributed memories also play an important role in con-
stituting our identities. 
 The spread of personal memory 
 BR2049 provides some interesting views on the nature of memory and 
its relation to technological objects and other persons. Objects and 
structures often play important roles in personal memory (Heersmink 
& Carter, in press; van Dijck,  2007 ). We frequently remember past 
experiences by interacting with objects such as photos, videos, books, 
letters, souvenirs, clothing, works of art, and various other mementos. 
Such artefacts can trigger memories of past events and experiences. For 
example, a photo album may remind one of a past holiday, a video taken 
at one’s graduation ceremony may remind one of that ceremony, a CD 
cover may remind one of a certain concert or festival one attended, and 
an old analogue camera may remind one of a past period in which 
one developed an interest in photography. Media theorist Sherry Turkle 
( 2007 ) refers to such artefacts as “evocative objects”:
 We fi nd it familiar to consider objects as useful or aesthetic, as 
necessities or vain indulgences. We are on less familiar ground 
when we consider objects as companions to our emotional lives or 
as provocations to thought. The notion of evocative object brings 
together these two less familiar ideas. Underscoring the insepar-
ability of thought and feeling in our relationship to things. We think 
with the objects we love, we love the objects we think with. 
 (Turkle,  2007 : 5) 
 When remembering our past, the contents of our memories are often 
infused with emotions. It’s not the case that we fi rst have a memory and 
then an emotional response to the memory; rather, the cognitive and 
affective are interwoven. In the phenomenology of remembering, it is 
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thus diffi cult to disentangle the cognitive and affective components of 
our personal memories. Evocative objects are thus rightly called  evoca-
tive as they trigger and mediate emotionally laden personal memories 
(Colombetti & Roberts,  2015 ). Such mediated memories can only 
arise when interacting with material culture. Jos é van Dijck argues: 
“Mediated memories can be located neither strictly in the brain nor 
wholly outside in (material) culture but exist in both concurrently, 
for they are complex manifestations of a complex interaction between 
brain, material objects, and the cultural matrix from which they arise.” 
(van Dijck,  2007 : 28) 
 Importantly, it is not just objects that play important roles in personal 
memory; other people such as family members, friends, and colleagues 
also play signifi cant roles in remembering our past. Cognitive psycholo-
gist Daniel Wegner ( 1987 ) developed a view on memory in which the 
memory systems of different persons are linked and interwoven. Wegner 
describes how small- scale social groups process and structure infor-
mation, thereby developing what he refers to as a transactive memory 
system. A transactive memory system is a cognitive system comprising 
people in close relationships in dyads or larger groups who engage col-
laboratively in encoding, storing, and retrieving information. Consider 
the following example of a transactive memory system in which a long- 
married couple try to remember the name of the show they saw on their 
honeymoon more than forty years ago (Harris et al.,  2010 ).
 Wife:  And we went to two shows, can you remember what 
they were called? 
 Husband:  We did. One was a musical, or were they both? 
I don’t … no … one— 
 Wife:  John Hanson was in it. 
 Husband:  Desert Song. 
 Wife:  Desert Song , that’s it, I couldn’t remember what it was 
called, but yes, I knew John Hanson was in it. 
 Husband:  Yes. 
 If you would ask the wife and husband individually, they would not be 
able to give you the answer to the question, but when they are able to 
give each other cues, they jointly construct the answer by integrating 
autobiographical information stored in different brains. Wegner points 
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out that transactive memory systems cannot be reduced to individual 
memory; rather, it is a group- level property that emerges from the 
interactions between its members. The emergent memory system is 
more than the sum of its parts. Typically, the longer group members 
know each other and the more shared experiences they have, the deeper 
their individual memory systems are integrated and the better the 
transactive memory system works. 
 Personal memory should thus not be seen as instantiated only in indi-
vidual brains, but as technologically and socially distributed (Heersmink, 
 2017 ,  2018 ). Therefore, to better understand human memory, we have 
to enlarge the unit of analysis from individuals to individuals interacting 
with objects and other persons. This is an important point in itself, but 
it also has implications for personal identity. If who we are as persons 
depends on and is shaped by our past experiences, and if being able to 
remember our past experiences depends on evocative objects and other 
people, then our personhood and sense of self are partly constituted by 
those environmental structures. Personhood is thus relational, a view 
which is also portrayed in  BR2049. 
 A key example of an evocative object in  BR2049 is the carved wooden 
horse. When K fi nds the wooden horse in the orphanage, he thinks he 
has discovered a tangible connection to his past, an evocative object 
linking his present self to his past childhood self. Discovering the 
wooden horse in the same location he remembered hiding it causes an 
identity crisis in K. When he asks Ana whether his memory is real, she 
answers: “Someone lived this, yes. This happened.” The wooden horse 
thus becomes the material proof that he had an actual childhood and 
was born rather than created in a laboratory, making him the “miracle 
child” instead of a mere replicant. 
 Another example of evocative objects is the little tin box containing a 
baby’s sock and a photo of Freysa standing next to the dead tree in front 
of Sapper Morton’s house. These objects (presumably) remind Sapper of 
the birth of Deckard and Rachael’s daughter that took place in his house. 
The dead tree itself serves as a memorial and a site of remembrance, 
somewhat similar to a gravestone. The tree has the date of Rachael’s 
death and Ana’s birth carved on it, which is the same date carved on the 
wooden horse.  BR2049 thus accurately portrays how humans keep evoca-
tive objects to remind them about past events which, in turn, helps them 
to construct their narrative identity. 
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 K has shared his implanted childhood memory with Joi, his holo-
graphic girlfriend. Joi repeatedly reminds K that the dates on the dead 
tree and wooden horse are the same, highlighting the possibility that 
Offi cer K may be the child of Rachael and Deckard. Joi thus helps 
Offi cer K to put the pieces of the puzzle of his fragmented and con-
fusing past together. A key feature of transactive memory systems is that 
its members typically have shared experiences and thus shared mem-
ories. This is clearly the case for K and Joi. They share many experiences 
such as talking in K’s apartment, kissing in the rain on the rooftop, ana-
lysing DNA sequences in the DNA Archive, and going to the orphanage 
in K’s spinner. In the fi lm, Joi has a more active role in K’s memory 
than the other way around. Joi’s memories are easily accessible to 
K. When Joi asks K to break the antenna on her emanator, she says “If 
they come here looking for you, they’ll have access to all my mem-
ories. You have to delete me from the console.”  BR2049 thus presents a 
future in which biological memory and cognition are interwoven not 
just with mere cognitive artefacts like calculators, navigation systems, 
and computers, but also with artifi cial companions. Current artifi cial 
companions such as robots don’t yet have the capacity to function as full 
transactive memory partners, but it is not diffi cult to imagine a future in 
which companion robots equipped with personalised AI systems exist as 
genuine transactive memory partners, perhaps in the manner depicted 
by  BR2049 . Yet there is another sense in which K’s implanted memory is 
shared. And this shared memory is the one that plays a fundamental role 
in his search for meaning and identity. 
 Vicarious memory 
 K and Ana Stelline share a memory. It was Ana who experienced the 
event in the orphanage, running away from the boys to hide the wooden 
horse from them. It was Ana who felt the emotions of that experi-
ence: fear at the thought of the punishment the boys would infl ict and 
at the thought of losing the precious object, but also the determination 
to not reveal its secret hiding place even in the face of violence. Yet K 
has access to this memory, to this experience, and these emotions. We 
saw that K has a quasi- memory of Ana’s experience, an implant of the 
memory that gives him a taste of what it was like to be another person. 
Yet profoundly important shared memories are available in much more 
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quotidian circumstances, too. In everyday life we share our memories 
with others through the stories we tell them, and in doing so we give 
them a taste of what it was like to be us. We also share in the memories 
and lives of others. When other people share their memories with us, we 
construct “vicarious memories” of those past events. 
 Vicarious memories are representations of events and experiences 
that happened to other people. They occur “when the memories of 
others become a part of reality for those who hear the memories but 
have not experienced the events to which the memories refer” (Teski & 
Climo,  1995 : 9). Even though you didn’t experience the event, you still 
construct a memory of the event, and such vicarious memories typic-
ally “have qualities that closely resemble memories of  fi rst- hand events, 
including vivid imagery, strong emotional and physical reactions, and 
long- lasting life in fl uence” (Pillemer et al.,  2015 : 234). Vicarious mem-
ories also play the same functional roles as personal memories, for 
example, guiding decision- making, developing or maintaining social 
relationships, or being incorporated into one’s identity. The key to 
understanding vicarious memory lies in the realm of emotions: “such 
memories evoke powerful feelings in individuals, which link them to 
important … events they did not experience directly in their individual 
lives— but which impact greatly on their identities” (Climo,  1995 : 173). 
 There is a key difference between quasi- memories and vicarious 
memories. Q- memories are representations of events where “someone 
experienced this.” The identity of the person may or may not be 
known. Vicarious memory, on the other hand, is usually presented as 
representations of experiences had by a particular other. One knows 
the identity of the other person, and one does not mistake those past 
experiences as one’s own. 7 
 By the end of the fi lm K holds something akin to a vicarious memory. 
Even though it has not been transmitted to him in the usual sense, 
through stories about the past, K’s memory has the function and phe-
nomenology of vicarious memories. K’s vicarious memory also performs 
a social function, connecting him more closely to Ana and Deckard. At 
the end of the fi lm, the following dialogue takes place:
 DECKARD:  You should’ve let me die out there. 
 K:  You did. You drowned out there. You’re free to meet 
your daughter, now. 
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 K:  All the best memories are hers. 
 DECKARD:  Why? Who am I to you? 
 K:  Go meet your daughter. 
 Deckard’s question to K is a poignant one. Although K doesn’t engage 
with it directly, one possible response to the question can be found in 
the role played by K’s vicarious memory. K’s memory allows him to 
feel empathy with Ana, to feel her pain and her loss. K and Deckard 
have formed an interpersonal connection, forged partly on the emotion 
and feeling found in K’s vicarious memory, a memory he shares with 
Deckard’s daughter. K and Deckard are “interlinked” by a vicarious 
memory. 
 Memory also serves a directive function, informing and guiding 
one’s present and future behaviour. K uses his vicarious memory, with 
its emotional force, to make choices that will affect not only him but 
Ana and Deckard. K’s vicarious memory guides his decision- making. 
As such, Ana is wrong when she tells K: “I can’t help your future, but 
I can give you good memories to think back on and smile.” Given the 
directive and forward- looking aspects of memories (both personal and 
vicarious), we can do more than look back on events with a smile. We 
can use those memories to guide us and determine how our futures 
will unfold. K’s vicarious memory, and the choices that it informs, also 
impacts on his identity. K has changed from being a mere puppet for the 
state, unquestioningly carrying out his duty, to making informed choices 
about the type of person he wants to be: one who shows empathy and 
who makes informed moral choices. If our identities are somehow 
constituted through our actions and choices (Korsgaard,  2009 ), then K 
uses the memory he shares with Ana to guide his actions and constitute 
his own identity: “[M] emories, if emotionally invested in, create their 
own effects … rather than experiences providing the basis for mem-
ories, memories become the basis for experiences” (Arnold- de Simine, 
 2013 : 32). Recalling Ana’s past vicariously has helped K choose how to 
act, helping him discover his own (evaluative) humanity. 
 The best memories 
 K’s journey from replicant to human (in the evaluative sense) is based on 
a memory, a memory that is socially shared and physically distributed. 
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Although the content of this memory doesn’t change, K’s relation to it 
shifts over time. The same memory is initially taken to be false, a mere 
implant used for controlling K. Then K has a quasi- memory, one which 
he takes to be a memory of his own past. He starts to use this memory 
to think about and shape his own future. But then his attitude to the 
memory shifts again, such that, by the end of the fi lm, his memory is 
more like vicarious memory. He knows the experience he remembers 
was Ana’s, but he feels emotionally connected to her through this 
memory, and it informs his decision to reunite her with Deckard, her 
father. K’s actions are based on empathic reactions to others, whom he 
connects to because of his shared memory. K’s choice to help Deckard 
and unite him with his daughter stems from the memory he shares 
with Ana, a vicarious memory. Even though it is not a memory of his 
experience, this shared memory helps K to shape and direct his own 
identity. It is this memory, a true but false memory, which helps K 
make decisions about his future and to forge his own identity. K’s and 
Ana’s memories and narratives are intertwined. From the perspective 
of K’s identity there is a sense in which he is wrong that “all the best 
memories are hers;” we should rather say that “all the best memories 
are  theirs .” 8 
 Notes 
 1  Both authors contributed equally to this chapter. 
 2  Flashbulb memories are memories “for the circumstances in which one fi rst 
learned of a very surprising and consequential (or emotionally arousing) 
event,” such as the assassination of John F. Kennedy, and they are thought to 
be recalled with “an almost perceptual clarity” (Brown & Kulik,  1977 : 73). 
Such fl ashbulb memories are not like fi xed snapshots of the past; they are still 
prone to change and inaccuracy (Neisser & Harsch,  1992 ). 
 3  See Nabokov ( 1962 / 1984: 40). In the novel  Pale Fire , the poet John Shade had 
a near- death experience in which he sees a tall white fountain. Mirroring the 
theme in BR2049 of false memory, Shade reads in a magazine that a woman 
had the same vision, and he thinks this is proof of the afterlife, only to fi nd 
that it was a misprint: it was a “mountain,” not a “fountain” that the woman 
saw. Nonetheless, “the error changes nothing:  the image of the tall white 
fountain had meaning not because it had some objective signifi cance, not 
because it was empirical proof of an afterlife, but because Shade ascribed 
meaning to it” (Page,  2017 ). As we shall see, it is the meaning that K ascribes 
to his “misprint” of a memory that is also important. 
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 4  Locke’s account of memory is complex and multifaceted (Copenhaver,  2017 ), 
and other readings of Locke do not ascribe to him a memory criterion for 
personal identity. See, for example, Atherton ( 1983 ). 
 5  We leave aside here other worries such as cases of fi ssion in which one 
person’s set of memories and other psychological properties are transferred 
into two different brains. See, for example, Parfi t ( 1984 ) and Schechtman 
( 2014 ). 
 6  See, for example, Shoemaker ( 1970 ) and Parfi t ( 1984 ). See also Schechtman 
( 1990 ) for a perspective on problems with the notion of q- memory. 
 7  From an aesthetic point of view, K’s implanted memory is depicted “from 
the outside”; that is, we can see the character in the scene as if the memory 
is being recalled from an external visual perspective, or an “observer per-
spective” (see Pillemer et al.,  2015 ). The scene does not use a point- of- view 
shot and, hence, is not portrayed from the original visual perspective, or 
a “fi eld perspective” (see Pillemer et  al.,  2015 ). In this manner, when we 
fi rst encounter the scene, it leaves open the identity of the protagonist of the 
memory. In particular, we are unsure if it is K depicted in the remembered 
scene (although the fact that the protagonist of the memory has long hair 
while all the boys in the orphanage appear to have shaved hair is a subtle clue 
that the protagonist of the memory is, in fact, female). K, too, is unsure of 
the identity of the person depicted in this remembered scene, although this is 
arguably not usually the case with observer- perspective memories: one’s iden-
tity is normally given immediately and non- inferentially (McCarroll,  2018 ). 
Interestingly, vicarious memories are typically recalled from an observer per-
spective (Pillemer et al.,  2015 ). 
 8  We would like to thank Tim Shanahan and Paul Smart for their very helpful 
review of the present chapter. Chris McCarroll would also like to thank his 
friend, Randal McKay, who fi rst took him to see  Blade Runner 2049 . 
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